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recurance

Patrick Soames

18 Apr 2023 · Coroner Edmund Gritt · South London

This report repeats 4 earlier warnings, and was raised again 1 time later. See the linked reports.

The coroner's concerns

  1. 1. fragmented information sharing across agencies

    “5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with [the deceased] in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him. However, that information was by reason of the agencies falling into different geographic areas. There was no single effective global focus for the information being acquired piecemeal about [the deceased]'s pattern of serious self-harming behaviour. The various agencies were significantly impeded in forming a single clear”
  2. 2. inaccessible GP records during out-of-hours

    “GPs act as a repository for information about contact with other clinical agencies (such as attendances at accident and emergency departments) and therefore serve as a point of contact for information about past history. However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP practice out of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the”
  3. 3. information siloing between local authority and NHS Trust

    “I was informed at inquest that one local authority (in whose area [the deceased] resided) had been made aware by police of the risk to [the deceased] following one of his self- harm incidents (in respect of a particularly important piece of information) and had relayed that information to a 6th NHS Trust (not one of the 5 from which I heard evidence at inquest) but [the deceased] did not reside in that Trust area. Those Trusts which did have direct contact with [the deceased] were never made aware of that piece of”
  4. 4. absence of national risk flagging system

    “I heard evidence that there is no national 'risk flagging' system: for example, when a person attends an accident and emergency department having self- harmed, the fact of a previous self-harm attendance at a different accident and emergency department is not systematically flagged up.”

Linked reports

Repeats an earlier warningDavid Buttriss12 Jan 2018 · 5 years 3 months earlier
Closely relatedConfidence 0.86 · high

Earlier report

“The Out of Hours GP, EE cid not have access to either the mental health or GP records”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗

This report

“it is either not possible to access information held by a GP practice out of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the”
Full chain: Out-of-hours clinicians cannot access regular GP records
Repeats an earlier warningMason Logue19 Jun 2019 · 3 years 10 months earlier
Closely relatedConfidence 0.90 · high

Earlier report

“The inquest heard evidence that the lack of a single IT system across NHS trusts meant that information sharing was more difficult.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗

This report

“5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with [the deceased] in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him.”
Full chain: Incompatible IT systems block cross provider record access
Repeats an earlier warningAmy Hogan31 Jul 2020 · 2 years 9 months earlier
Closely relatedConfidence 0.85 · high

Earlier report

“It is a matter of concern that delayed, incomplete or non-existent transfer of patient data from one practice to another on moving places an unfair burden on patients to accurately recall and relay their own medical histories.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗

This report

“However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP practice out of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department.”
Full chain: Out-of-hours clinicians cannot access regular GP records
Repeats an earlier warningFelicity Clough26 Nov 2021 · 1 year 5 months earlier
Closely relatedConfidence 0.90 · high

Earlier report

“I have concerns that future deaths could occur due to the lack of access to information held on individual Police force systems by other forces, especially neighbouring forces who may both have contact with individuals.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗

This report

“5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with [the deceased] in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him.”
Full chain: Lack of access to police force information across forces
Raised again laterJohn Spencer19 May 2025 · 2 years 1 month later
Closely relatedConfidence 0.80 · moderate

This report

“it is either not possible to access information held by a GP practice out of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department.”

Later report

“The GP medical history summary, populated by the GP that a patient is registered to, is not always accessible to a GP out of hours surgery.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗
Full chain: Out-of-hours clinicians cannot access regular GP records

Responses

No published response was found on judiciary.uk.

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Source: Prevention of Future Deaths reports and responses published by the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary at judiciary.uk. Crown copyright, used under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Data updated 26 Oct 2026.

A link shows that a similar concern was raised again, not why. It is not a finding about any organisation or person. Methodology and responsible use · Report an error