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recurance

David Jukes

12 Jul 2019 · Coroner Emma Brown · Birmingham and Solihull

This report repeats 2 earlier warnings, and was raised again 3 times later. See the linked reports.

The coroner's concerns

  1. 1. insufficient information about arrest circumstances

    “The psychiatric liaison and diversion practitioner employed by BCPFT who attended to review Mr. [name redacted] in Oldbury custody suite on the 28th September 2018 did not have sufficient information about the history of arrest to inform her decision making on assessment in custody. She was provided with a print out of the first two pages of the custody record which included the statutory arrest reason and the circumstances of arrest but nothing that indicated that he had barricaded himself in the loft, threated”
  2. 2. breakdown in communication between services

    “The above psychiatric liaison and diversion practitioner gave evidence that she contacted either the duty bed manager for BSMHT or the BSMHT liaison and diversion team based at Perry Barr custody suite and was informed that Mr. [name redacted] was not known to the service. She stated that if she had been aware that he was open to the HTT she would have sought information about his involvement and would have made the team aware that he was in custody and the events of the previous evening. It was not”
  3. 3. failure to conduct mental health assessment in police custody

    “Despite not being informed by the BCPFT liaison and diversion nurse that Mr [name redacted] was in custody the HTT were made aware by his wife that he was in custody on the 28th September 2018. She also gave some information about the circumstances of his arrest, further information about the incident and police involvement had been reported to Street Triage during the night and was noted in the RIO notes. Despite this, no psychiatrist visited or attempted to visit Mr. [name redacted] in custody which it was stated”
  4. 4. inadequate patient location tracking and follow-up

    “Following his release from custody on the 28th September 2018 and evidence from a psychologist that he was threating suicide and harm to others, on the 2nd October 2018 the HTT's only recorded attempt to contact Mr. [name redacted] before the 9th October 2018 was a single call (which probably mistakenly went to his wife's phone) on the 4th October 2018. Despite the fact that his location was unknown and he had not attended a planned medical review on the 4th October 2018 there was no email communication”
  5. 5. failure to implement meeting action plans

    “It was planned that Mr. [name redacted] would be discussed at a team meeting on the 3rd October 2018 after the psychologist raised concerns on the 2nd. There is no credible evidence he was discussed or a plan made to locate and assess him. No explanation was provided in evidence nor was evidence given of a strategy to guard against this occurring in future. Therefore there continues to be a risk that plans to discuss patients in meetings will not be followed through”
  6. 6. delayed risk assessment after patient re-engagement

    “On the 9th October 2018 a HTT clinician talked to Mr. [name redacted] on the phone at which time he sounded intoxicated, was calm and polite, gave his location and agreed to attend an appointment for a medical review on the 12th October 2018 if a bus pass were provided to his location for him to attend. No arrangements were made in an attempt to assess Mr [name redacted] before the 12th October 2018. By this time there was reason to suspect Mr. [name redacted] was at risk of harm to self or others, was under the influence of”

Linked reports

Repeats an earlier warningKirsty Pritchard17 Oct 2014 · 4 years 9 months earlier
Identical hazardConfidence 0.90 · high

Earlier report

“there were deficiencies in the systems in place for contacting and finding the patient. In this case the patient had contacted the CHTT with a real and immediate risk of self harm”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗

This report

“Following his release from custody on the 28th September 2018 and evidence from a psychologist that he was threating suicide and harm to others, on the 2nd October 2018 the HTT's only recorded attempt to contact Mr. [name redacted] before the 9th October 2018 was a single call”
Full chain: Delayed patient location despite police assistance
Repeats an earlier warningDean Saunders17 Feb 2017 · 2 years 5 months earlier
Closely relatedConfidence 0.90 · high

Earlier report

“The admitted lacuna in the SEPT admissions protocol governing the transfer of mentally disordered people from police custody.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗

This report

“Despite not being informed by the BCPFT liaison and diversion nurse that Mr [name redacted] was in custody the HTT were made aware by his wife that he was in custody on the 28th September 2018.”
Full chain: Missing mental health assessment in police custody
Raised again laterKhalid Yousef23 Jun 2022 · 2 years 11 months later
Closely relatedConfidence 0.85 · high

This report

“Despite not being informed by the BCPFT liaison and diversion nurse that Mr [name redacted] was in custody the HTT were made aware by his wife that he was in custody on the 28th September 2018.”

Later report

“The L&D police custody suite model has not commissioned psychiatrists.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗
Full chain: Missing mental health assessment in police custody
Raised again laterIvan Ignatov8 Jun 2023 · 3 years 11 months later
Closely relatedConfidence 0.92 · high

This report

“Despite this, no psychiatrist visited or attempted to visit Mr. [name redacted] in custody which it was stated in evidence was the usual practice of the team.”

Later report

“During his time in police custody, it was identified by the custody sergeants that [the deceased] required a face to face assessment by the mental health practitioner. This did not happen.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗
Full chain: Missing mental health assessment in police custody
Raised again laterMiles Hurley9 Jul 2024 · 5 years later
Closely relatedConfidence 0.90 · high

This report

“She stated that if she had been aware that he was open to the HTT she would have sought information about his involvement”

Later report

“Lack of effective documentation and communication between the Liaison Diversion Service (LDS) and the police within the custody suite.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗
Full chain: Missing mental health hand‑over in custody

Responses

2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England.pdf ↗· NHS England

Stated action · end of March 2020

“NHS England and NHS Improvement will work with police forces to ensure that all relevant information from a police perspective is given to the liaison and diversion practitioner, including the nature of the detained person's presentation at the point of arrest, if relevant.”

Stated action · end of March 2020

“We will commit to a national event by the end of March 2020 to debrief on this matter and any other information sharing/exchange issues that have been raised in other reports.”

Stated action · end of March 2020

“High quality care for all, now and for future generations”

Stated action · summer 2020

“Connect will be available in custody”

Stated action · summer 2020

“three liaison and diversion teams will have access to partitioned parts of the police system that helps them understand the context of the persons arrival into custody and more information about historical custody appearances.”

Stated action · summer 2020

“All liaison and diversion teams have had information sharing training and this training offer has also been made to Police Healthcare providers”

2019-0329-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-CCG.pdf ↗· Birmingham and Solihull Clinical Commissioning Group

Stated action

“The CCG has been working closely with both local mental health service providers and the third sector, with the aim of improving the service offer for people experiencing a mental health crisis. Stakeholders are working on designing community based services, which will increase accessibility for those in crisis and their families, to deliver the most appropriate support at the earliest opportunity.”

2019-0329-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust.pdf ↗· Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust

Stated action · late September 2019

“implementing a documented and recognised system within our bed management team for all such calls which includes phonetic spelling and other controls to ensure a consistent approach to this matter”

2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust.pdf ↗· Black Country Partnership NHS Foundation Trust

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Source: Prevention of Future Deaths reports and responses published by the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary at judiciary.uk. Crown copyright, used under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Data updated 26 Oct 2026.

A link shows that a similar concern was raised again, not why. It is not a finding about any organisation or person. Methodology and responsible use · Report an error